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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
CALVIN L. RAMPTON, Governor 
of the State of Utah, and the STATE 
OF UTAH, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
HA VEN J. BARLOW, President of 
the Senate of the State of Utah, and 
LORIN N. PACE, Speaker of the 
House of Representatives of the State 
of Utah, et. al., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 11725 
BRIEF OF DE-FENDANTS AND RE8PONDENTS 
NATURE OF CASE 
The statement of case is adequately set forth in the 
appellants' brief. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The appellants filed suit in the District Court of the 
'I'hird .Judicial District challenging the constitutionality 
of Section 5 ( 1), Senate Bill 10, 38th Legislature of the 
State of Utah, 53-48-5 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, known 
as the Higher Education Act of 1969. Answer was duly 
filPd and the matter submitted to the trial court on the 
pleadings. The matter was heard before the Honorable 
Merrill C. Faux, District Judge, and on the 25th day 
of J nne, 1969, judgment was entered declaring that the 
challenged statute was constitutional. 
1 
:B,ELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Repondents submit this court should affirm the de-
cision of the Utah District Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 




ARTICLE VII, SECTION 10 OF THE CONSTITUTION 
OF UTAH PERMITS THE LEGISLATURE TO MAKE AP-
POINTMENTS TO STATE OFFICES WHICH IT CREATES. 
The principal basis upon which the plaintiff rests his 
case is Article VII, Section 10 of the Constitution of 
Utah. It is the plaintiffs' claim that the provisions of 
Senate Bill 10, Section 5 ( 1), passed by the 38th Legis-
lature of the State of Utah, 53-48-5, U.C.A., 1953 (Higher 
Education Act of 1969) providing for the appointment of 
three resident citizens to the State Board of Higher Edu-
cation by each the President of the Senate and the Speak-
er of the House of Representatives, impinges upon the 
Governor's executive right to appoint officers of the 
state. 
Insofar as the Article VII, Section 10, is pertinent 
here, it provides as follows: 
"The Governor shall nominate, and by and 
within the consent of the senate, appoint all state 
and district office's whose of fices are established 
by this Constitution, or which may be created by 
law, and whose appointment or election is not 
otherwise provided for ... " 
Defendants contend that this provision requires the 
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governor to nominate and appoint state and district 
officers in two situations: First, where the offices are 
created by the Constitution, and second, where new of-
fices are created by law which does not provide for their 
appointment or election. 
T1H· plaintiff intPq>r<:'ts this lang1rngt' to 111Pan that: 
" ... the foregoing provision was intended to 
place in the governor, as chief executive officer 
of the state, the power to appoint all rxecntive 
officers whose election or appointment is not 
otherwise provided for in the constitution." 
However, the portion of the Constitutional section 
involved does not support this conclusion. The section 
in clPar language clearly establishes two areas wherein 
the Governor is directed by the Constitution to make 
appointments. Article VII Section 10. First, he: 
" ... shall nominate, and by and with the 
consent of the Senate, appoint all state and dis-
trict officers whose offices arP PstahlishPd hy this 
Constitution, ... " 
Second, he shall appoint officers to fill offices: 
" . . . which may be created by law, and 
whose appointment or election is not otherwise 
vrovided for." (Emphasis ours.) 
The petitioner interprets the language "otht>rwise pro-
ridPrl for" to rE"fer to the Constitution. Had this been 
tht> intPnt of thP framPrs of the Constitution, the provi-
:;ion would simply have stated that: 
"The governor shall nominate, and by and 
with the consent of the senate, appoint all state 
and district officers whose offices are established 
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by this constitution or created by law, except 
otherwise provided herein." ' 
A grammatical reading of the provision also demon-
strates the folly of plaintiff's strained interpretatiton. 
The main clause of the sentence is: 
"The governor shall nominate, and by and 
with the consent of the senate, appoint all state 
and district officers whose offices are established 
by this constitution, ... " 
This expresses a complete thought. More simplified, the 
main thought could be stated as follows: 
"The governor shall appoint and nominate all 
state and district constitutional officers." 
The second half of the sentence is a subordinate qualify-
ing clause, which limits the main clause. The prepositional 
phrase "provided for" refers back to the closest noun 
in the same clause, so that the grammatical sense becomes, 
and whose appointment or election is not otherwise pro-
vided for "by law." If the prepositional phrase "provided 
for" is made to refer to the noun "constitution" which 
appears in the previous main clause, violence is done to a 
settled principal of English grammar which we should 
assume the authors of our Consitution understood. But 
as will appear, there are far more weighty considerations 
which compel an unstrained interpretation of this pro-
vis10n. 
The plaintiff suggests that since various provisions 
of the Constitution, relating to the organization and 
duties of certain officers and agencies established by the 
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constitution use the language "except as otherwise pro-
rided by law," or its equivalent, that the language of 
Article VII, Section 10 "whose appointment or election 
is not otherwise provided for" was intended to mean "pro-
rided for in the constitution." However, if an accurate 
grammatical reading of the constitutional section is 
made, the preposition phrase "provided for" refers to 
"by law." A proper grammatical reading of the sentence 
as it is written, makes this section entirely consistent in 
construction and form with the neighboring sections. An 
awkward and unnecessary repetition of tenns would have 
resulted, i.e., " ... or which may be created by law, and 
whose appointment or election is not otherwise provided 
for" by law. 
The appointive power of the governor is conferred in 
the cases of future legislation to those instances where the 
legislature has not made other provision for appointment. 
The power to make appointments to· public office does 
not inherently belong to the Governor, but must be de-
rived from the Constitution or statutes implementing it. 
Nor does the appointive power necessarily belong to the 
executive branch of government. 38 Am. Jur. 2d, Gov-
rrnor, Section 5, p. 935, -12 Am. Jur., Public Officers, Sec-
tion 93. The Utah Constitution is not one of grant, but 
one of limitation, and consequently the Legislature is not 
restricted in its enactments unless the restriction is 
rxpressly or by necessary implication set forth by the 
Constitution itself. University of Utah v. Board of Ex-
ami·11ers, -1- lT.2d 408, 295 P.2d348 (1956). 
The people of the state are the main spring of 
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government, and it is to them that the power of selectinK 
individuals for office inherently belongs. The power ot 
appointment to public offices "belongs where the people 
have chosen to place it by their Constitution or laws.'' 
42 Am. Jur., Public Officers, Section 92. See ArticlP J 
Section 2, Utah Constitution: "All political power is in-
herent in the people; ... " The people through their Con-
stitution may confer the power to make appointments 
upon the Governor or upon other selected or designated 
officers. See 67 C.J.S., Officers, Section 29, p. 157, 97 
A.L.R. 2d 361. Each State Constitution is unique hecausP 
the people of the various states, through their constitu-
tions, have authorized public officers, quasi public of-
ficers or private organizations to make appointments 
to public offices 
This principle is so well settled that it has not ]H'P-
viously been drawn into question before the Supreme 
Court of our State, except in an indirect way in the case 
of State ex rel Hwmmond v. Maxfield, 103 Utah 1, 
132 P.2d 660 (1942) where this Court had before it a 
case challenging the constitutionality of an act of the 
Legislature of 1933 which created a new body or commis-
sion known as the Engineering Commission. The act 
also amended some sections of the statutes of Utah re-
lating to the State Road Commission, and provided for 
the termination of the tenure in office of persons then 
members of that commission. The act provided that mem-
bers of the Engineering Commission " ... shall serve as 
the members of the State Road Commission". The prin-





Jat.ure, a:-; part of the plan of reorganization, could pro-
v:ide for the tennination of the incumhency of the oc-
cupants of tlw of fices of the Road Commissioners 
011 the appointment and qualification of members of the 
newly created Engineering Commission to serve ex of-
ficio as members of the State Road Conunission. This 
court sustained the validity of the Act. The following 
is taken from the opinion : 
"The courts are confronted with the principle 
that the power to create an office being in the 
Legislature, ordinarily the power to abolish it 
must also reside there. At one and the same time 
the courts are conf ronteid with another prin-
ciple that the power to fill an office, at least if 
not otherwise provided for in the act creating 
the office, is executive and under a constitutional 
provision such as Art. VII, Sec. 10, of onr Con-
stitution, absent at least any contrary expression 
of the legislature, such power lies with the gov-
ernor . ... (Emphasis ours)." 
Of particular importance in the instance case is the 
language of the court to the effect that the power to fill 
an office, " ... if not otherwise provided for in the act 
creating the office . . . " is executive in nature, and in 
the absence of contrary expression of the legislature, 
such becomes the governor's prerogative. Thus the legis-
lature clearly has the authority under the Constitution 
tu appoint persons to the state offices. 
As will be observed, Idaho, Montana and Colorado 
have constitutional provisions which are virtually iden-
tical to Article VII, Section 10 of the Utah Constitution. 
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As will appear, the Supreme Court of each of those states 
has interpreted this provision to mean that the legis. 
lature can appoint officers to fill office'S which it creates. 
The Supreme Court of Idaho in the case of Ingard 
v. Barker, 27 Idaho 124, 147 Pac. 293, 294, 295, discussed 
this provision in detail. There the Governor directed 
the Secretary of State to issue commissions as members 
of the State Board of Horticultural Inspection to the 
plaintiff and two other individuals. The secretary of 
state complied with the direction of the governor insofar 
as it pertained to one of the individuals but declined to 
comply with the same insofar as it pertained to the 
plaintiff and another, alleging that as to them the at-
tempted appointment was void because it was in conflict 
with a state statute which provided: 
"The State Board of Horticultural Inspectors 
shall consist of five ( 5) members, who shall be ap-
pointed by the Governor of the state, . . . ; and 
in making said appointments, the Governor shall 
consider any recommendations made by the State 
Horticultural Association as the proper person to 
be so appointed." 
The appointments of the governor were not indi-
viduals selected by the State Horticultural Association. 
The plaintiff brought an original action in the Sup-
reme Court for the purpose of securing a writ of man-
date directing the defendant, as secretary of state, to 
issue to him a commission as a member of the State 
Board of Horticultural Inspection. One of the two ques-
tions submitted for decision was: 
8 
"It is competent for the legislature to provide 
that the State Horticultural Association shall have 
the right of authority to present or recommend 
to the governor a list of the names from which he 
must appoint the members of the State Board of 
Horticultural Inspection?" 
"Section 1, art. 2, of the Constitution, pro-
vides that: 
" 'The powers of the government of this 
state are divided into three distinct depart-
ments, the legislative, executive and judicial; 
and one person or collection of the persons 
charged with the exercise of powers properly 
belong to one of these departments, shall 
exercise any powers properly belonging to 
either of the others, except as in this Consti-
tution expressly directed or permitted.' " 
Section 6 of article 4 provides that: 
" 'The Governor shall nominate and, by 
and with the consent of the Senate, appoint 
all officers whose offices are established by 
this Constitution, or which may be created by 
law and whose appointment or election is not 
otherwise proiVided for.'" 
"Section 1 of article 2, and section 6 of article 
4 supra, have been construed by the Supreme 
Court of this state in the case of In re Inman, 8 
Idaho, 398,69 Pac. 120, and in the case of Elliott v. 
McCrea, 23 Idaho 524, 130 P. 785, to the effect 
that the Legi'Slature may create an office or of-
fices, which may be filled by appointment either by 
the chief executive or by any person, board, cor-
poration, or association of individuals, and that 
such appointment would not be in conflict with 
the Constitution or an improper exercise of power 
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properly belonging to the executive d0partment 
of the state government; and as stated by 
court in the case of El ._ott v. McCrea, supra, the 
Constitution itself provides the method of selec-
tion of legislative, executive, and judicial officers 
named in the Constitution. 
"(2) The framers of the Constitution could 
not foresee what offices might be created by laws 
subsequently enacted, and so they provided that 
such offices should be filled by the Governor 
unless the appointment or should be othPr: 
wise provided for. The legislature, in enacting 
the statute in question, has exercised its constitu-
tional right in naming and designating the officer 
or officers who shall make these particular ap-
pointments. 
" ( 4) Primarily the rule is well settled by 
numerous authorities that, in the absence' of a con-
stitutional provision to the contrary, any one 
of the three departments of government may, un-
der the authority of the statute, appoint for any 
class of office in any of the three governmental 
departments. (Citing cases.) 
" ( 5) A state legislative body, existing by 
virtue of a constitutional provision, has power 
to enact any laws that are not expressly or by 
nec<:'ssary implication prohibited either by the fed-
eral Constitution or by the Constitution of the 
state. (Citing cases including Kimball v. Grants-
ville, 19 Ut. 368, 57 P. 1, 45 L.R.A. 628.) 
" ( 6) The power to create an office, unlrss 
otherwise provided by the Constitution, is vested 
in the legislative department of the government. 
The method of filHng the office is to be be deter-
mined by the Legislature, in the absence of consti-
tutional provision. (Citing cases.) 
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"The power of the Legislature to pass laws 
regulating appointments to statutory offices is 
absolute, unless re1 !trained by some constitutional 
provision. (Citing .. ) 
"Section 6 of article 4 of the Constitution pro-
vides: 
" 'The Governor shall nominate and, by 
and with the consent of the Senate, appoint all 
officers whose offices are established by this 
Constitution, or which may be created by law 
and whose appointment or election 1s not 
otherwise provided for.' 
"Under this constitutional provision, the 
Legislature has the power to create an office and 
provide for the fillling of the same whenever such 
office is not established by the Constitution, and 
to provide for the appointment of such officer 
either by the chief executive or in any manner 
that in ths wisdom of the legislature: it may deem 
proper; there being no inhibition in the Constitu-
tion as to the creation of other offices than those 
named therein, but, on the contrary, there being 
an express recognition of such power in the fol-
lowing terms: 'Or which may be created by law, 
and whose appointment or election is not other-
wise provided for.' Many officers in this state 
have been created by law that were not provided 
for in the Constitution, and in numerous instances 
the manner of their appointment has been clearly 
provided for by law. The chief executive in cer-
tain instances has been given the absolute power 
to nominate and appoint persons to fill certain 
offices created by the Legislature. This however, 
is not true in all cases. In some instances it re-
quires the concurrence of certain state officials, 
whose offices are provided for by the Constitu-
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ti.on, in order to make appointments by the Gov. 
ernor legal, in others the concurrence of the Sen-
ate, and in still others, the concurrence of a major-
ity of certain boards. 
"(7) That the Legislature may limit the 
power of the chief executive in the matter of mak-
ing appointments cannot be successfully refuted." 
(Citing case.) 
" ( 8) We have therefore reached the con-
clusion that section 1310, Rev. Codes, as amended 
' supra, is constitutional and not in violation of 
section 1, art. 2, and section 6, art. 4 of the Consti-
tution of this state, and that it was clearly within 
the power of the Legislature to enact said statu-
tory provision." 
In the earlier case of Elliott v. McCrea, 23 Idaho 
524, 130 P. 785, 786 (1913), the constitutionality of an 
Idaho House Bill was challenged because it provided for 
the appointment of drainage commissioners for the dis-
rict by the judge of the district court of the judicial dis-
trict in which the drainage district was located. The fol-
lowing is taken from the Court's opinion sustaining the 
constitutionality of the bill: 
"Again, the Constitution (section 6, art. 4), 
provides that the Governor 'shall nominate and, 
by and with the consent of the Senate, appoint 
all officers whose offices are established hy this 
Constitution, or which may be created by law and 
whose appointment or election is not otherwisr 
provided for.' The Constitution itself provides 
the method of selection of the legislative, execu-
tive, and judicial officers named in the Constitu-
tion. The framers of the Constitution, however, 
could not foresee what offices might 'be created Ly 
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law' subsequently enacted, and so they provided 
that such offices should be filled by the Governor, 
unless the appointment or election should be 
'otherwise provided for.' The Legislature in this 
case has 'otherwise provided.' They have clearly 
exercised their constitutional right in naming and 
designating the person or officer who shall make 
these particular appointments. This question has 
received frequent consideration by the courts, and 
they have almost invariably reached the conclu-
sions we have indicated. (Citing cases.)" 
The same result was reached in the case of J,n re In-
man, 8 Idaho 398, 69 P. 120, where the Medical Bill of 
1899 was challenged as being unconstitutional that it con-
travened Section 1, Article 2 of the Constitution: 
"The powers of the government of this state 
are divided into three distinct departments, the 
legislative, executive, and judicial, and no person, 
or collection of persons, charged with the exercise 
of powers properly belonging to one of these de-
partments shall exercise any powers properly 
belonging to either of the others, except as in this 
constitution expressly directed or permitted." 
Section 6, of Article 4 of the Idaho Constitution, 
states: 
"The governor shall nominate and by and 
with the consent of the senate, appoint all officers 
whose offices are established by this constitution, 
or which may be created by law, and whose ap-
pointment or election is not otherwise provided 
for." 
Petitioner claimed that since the Medical Act author-
ized the Governor to name and appoint the State Board 
of Medical Examiners, without the assent and concur-
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rence of the senate, the same was in violation of the con-
stitutional sections quoted. 
The Court said: 
"The act in question does not contravene either 
of said provisions of the constitution. Sec. 6, Art. 
4, supra, points out the manner of filling offices 
whose appointment or election is not otherwise 
provided for by law. But in the act in question 
the legislature has provided, as it has power to 
do under the constitution, for the appointment bv 
the governor." · 
See also Smylie v. Williams, 81 Idaho 335, 341 P.2d 
451 (1959). 
It is to be noted that the language of section 6 of 
Article 4 of the Idaho Constitution which is given inter-
pretation is identical to Section 10, Article VII of the 
Utah Constitution. 
The Montana Constitution, Article VII, Section 7, is 
identical to Article VII, Section 10 of the Utah Consti-
tution. The Montana provision states: 
"The governor shall nominate, and by and 
with the consent of the Senate, appoint all officers 
whose offices are established by this constitution, 
or which may be created by law, and whose ap-
pointment or election is not otherwise provided 
for .... " 
The Supreme Court of Montana in the case of In re 
Terrett, 34 Mont. 325, 333, 86 P. 266, 267, had before 
it an act of the 1903 Montana legislature which imposed 
upon the district judges the duty of appointing persons 
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to select bounty inspectors. Although the court held 
that the petitioner could not challenge this appointment 
in his case, it made this pertinent observation: 
"However, under ·section 7, art. 7 of the con-
stitution, the power to appoint or delegate the 
appointing power is reserved to the people, acting 
through the Legislature, in every instance, except 
in those enumerated in the Constitution. The ap-
pointment of these persons to select the bounty 
inspector could properly be delegated by the Legis-
lature, as they are offices whose appointment is 
not otherwise provided for in the Constitution 
itself." 
The Colorado Constitution was adopted in 1876, twenty 
years before Utah became a state, and probably served 
as a model for our Constitution. 
In the early case of People v. Osborne, 7 Colo. 605, 
4 P. 1074 (1884), the Supreme Court of Colorado had 
before it an 1881 Act of the legislature which created a 
State Industrial School, the supervision of which was 
placed in the Board of Control who was to be appointed 
by the governor. Article 14, Section 6 of the Colorado 
Constitution states: 
"The governor shall nominate, by and with 
the consent of the senate, appoint all officers 
whose offices are established by this constitution, 
or which may be created by law, and whose ap-
pointment or election is not otherwise provided 
for, ... If, during the recess of the senate, a 
vacancy occurs in any such office, the governor 
shall appoint some fit person to discharge the 
duties thereof until the next meeting of the senate. 
" 
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The Court said: 
"A comparison of the foregoing provisions 
of the constitution with those of section 2, supra 
of the statute shows that, while an officer appoint'. 
ed to fill a vacancy by virtue of the provisions 
of the statute holds the office for the unexpired 
term of his predecessor, one appointed under the 
provisions of the constitution holds only until the 
next meeting of the senate." 
"It is evident, then, that if the offices in ques-
tion had been created by the constitution, the 
statutory provisions for the filling of vacancies 
would be in conflict with the constitutional pro-
visions on the same subject, and to the extent of 
the variance, the statute would be void. But these 
offices were not created by the constitution, but 
by the statute; nor can it be said that the consti-
tution has provided either for original appoint 
ments to fill the offices. or for appointments to 
fill vacancies in said of fices, since both events are 
'otherwise provided for' by the statute. This being 
so, the fundamental principal obtains that the 
legislature has unlimited power in regard to legis-
lation, save only as to restrictions imposed by the 
constitution. (Citing authorities.) 
The same provision of the Colorado Constitution 
was challenged in People ex rel. Walker v. Capp, 61 Colo. 
396, 158 P. 143 (1916). The right of the legislature 
to prescribe the manner and person to be appointed war-
den of the state reformatory was upheld in this language: 
"Neither is it true, as argued, that section 6 of 
article 4 of the constitution controls as to the ap-
pointment of the warden of the reformatory. rrhis 
section reads : 
" 'The governor shall nominate, and by 
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and with the consent of the senate, appoint 
all officers whose offices are established by 
this and whose appointment or election is not 
otherwise provided for.• • ,.., 
"The appointment of the warden of the state 
reformatory is otherwise provided for, and under 
the decision of the appellate courts of this state, 
- (Citing cases) - the statute which provides 
for the manner of appointment of such officers is 
controlling. 
• • • 
"Our constitution does not confer upon any 
officer the power to appoint a warden of the re-
formatory, hence it rested solely with the legis-
lature to give that right and take it away. It had 
exclusive power to say who should appoint the 
warden of the state reformatory and to qualify 
or modify the appointing power by such limita-
tions as it chose to impose. The legislature has 
the right to change its laws. It had the same power 
to prescribe the manner of appointing a warden 
of the reformatory, as in the civil service law pro-
vided, that it had when it provided for the manner 
of his appointment in the act creating the institu-
tion." 
Under similar circumstances the Arizona Supreme 
Court in Lockwood, Post Auditor v. Jordan, State .Audi-
tor, 72 Ariz. 77, 231 P.2d 428, upheld the constitutionality 
of a state statute placing the appointing power to certain 
state officers with the President of the Senate and Speak-
er of the House of Representatives, with the approval 
of the Senate and House. Article III of the Arizona Con-
stitution reads as follows: 
"The powers of the government of the State 
of Arizona shall be divided into three separate 
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d:partments, the _exec1:tive, the jndi. 
cial; and, except as provided m this Constitution 
such departments shall be separate and distinct 
and no one of such departments shall 
the powers properly belonging to either of the 
others." 
(This provision is substantially the same as Article 
V, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution.) 
The Arizona court ref erred to and quoted from the 
earlier case of Dunbar vs. Cronin, 18 Ariz. 583, 1 (i-1- P. 
447, 454, relating to the establishment of a state library 
with a law and legislative reference bureau, and which 
provided for the appointment of a Board of Curators 
and a librarian. The statute designated the individual 
who was to fill the position. In that case the appointive 
power of the legislature was challenged as being in viola-
tion of the Arizona Constitution. The court said: 
"The only instances under the Constitution 
in which the power of appointment is made exclu-
sively executive are the specific ones above enu-
merated, and such others may occur when an 
office becomes vacant and the law or the Constitu-
tion has provided no mode for filling such vacan-
cy .... " 
The Arizona Supreme Court upheld the validity of 
the statute in the Lockwood case in this concluding lan-
guage: 
"We therefore hold that since there is no re-
striction in the Constitution against the exercise 
of such powers by the legislature that it was act-
ing fully within the scope of its legislative author-
ity in providing for appointment of post auditor 
to be made as in the Act provided." 
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Si'e also Riley v. State, 43 Okl. 65, 141 P. 264, to the 
same effect. 
There are two Utah cases, both decided before state-
hood and dealing with problems other than the construc-
tion of the constitutional provision involved in the present 
case, which may be helpful to briefly review. 
In the case of People v. Clayton, 4 Utah 421, 11 P. 206 
(1886). The territorial legislature enacted a statute pur-
suant to the organic act of Utah which contained restric-
tions upon the territorial legislature, and also pursuant 
to a federal statute which also imposed limitations upon 
the territorial legislature. The primary issue was whether 
or not the territorial statute providing for the election of 
an auditor was valid inasmuch as the organic act required 
the governor to appoint the state auditor. The court was 
concerned with the limitations of the territorial legisla-
ture imposed by the organic act and also be section 1857 
of the Revised Statutes of the United States which con-
tained a similar limitation. Section 7 of the organic act 
of the territory provided in part as follows: 
". . . the governor shall nominate, and by and 
with the advice and consent of the legislative coun-
cil, appoint, all officers not herein otherwise pro-
vided for; ... " (Emphasis added.) 
The court held that the words "not otherwise herein 
provided for" created in the governor a power of appoint-
ment which could not be delegated to nor usurped by the 
territorial legislature. Since neither the organic act nor 
the federal statute contained a provision permitting the 
legislature to provide for the election of the auditor, the 
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court held that the statute so providing was void. 
A similar question was raised in M cCornick rs. 
Pratt, 8 Ut. 294, 30 P. 1091, (1892) decided prior to state-
hood. The question before the court related to the validity 
of a territorial statute appropriating funds for the con-
struction of buildings for the agricultural college and that 
certain officials would be ex officio trustees of a con-
struction committee. Focus was centered on the ques-
tion of whether or not the legislative means of selooting 
the trustees deprived the governor of his constitutional 
power under the organic act and the Federal Statute, 
to make the appointments. The same rationale was fol-
lowed as in the People vs. Clayton case, supra, since the 
same provisions of the organic act and the federal statute 
were involved. The court held that a statute could not be 
passed in contravention of the organic act which author-
ized the governor to make all appointments ". . . not 
otherwise herein provided for." (Emphasis added.) 
The Utah cases of People vs. Clayton, 4 Utah 421, 11 
P. 206, (1886) and McCorriAck v. Pr.(})tt, 8 Ut. 294, 30 P. 
1061 (1892) support the interpretation of the present lan-
guage in Article VII, Section 10, made by this court in 
State ex rel Hammond v. Maxwell, 103 Utah 1, 132 P.2d 
660,663 (1942) referred to above. The comparable section 
of the organic act of Utah used the word "herein." When 
the Utah Constitution was adopted the word "herein' was 
used in Article V, Section 1. That section provides that 
no department of government shall exercisa any functions 
pertaining to either of the other departments, except in 
the cases "herein expressly diercted or permitted" (em-
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hasis ours). However, Article VII, Section 10 omits the 
"herein" which was previously contained in the 
comparable section of the organic law of Utah. This 
clearly shows that the framers of the Constitution were 
aware of the importance of the word "herein." They 
plainly provided that each department of government 
would exercise its own powers except in those situations 
expressly otherwise provided within the Constitution it-
self. But as noted, Article VII, Section 10 of the Consti-
tution omits the use of the word "herein." This omission 
was made even though that term had been used in the 
comparable provisions of the organic act of Utah and 
there had been two cases construing its meaning. 
The following principle of statutory construction is 
applicable here : 
"The omission of a word in the amendment of 
a statute will be assumed to have been intentional 
Where the meaning of the prior law is intended 
to be continued, its terminology is also usually 
continued, so that an omission of words implies 
an intended change in the meaning of the statute. 
Under these rules, the courts may not add a re-
striction found in a prior statute, but omitted 
from a later one." 
50 Am. Jur., Statutes, Sec. 276, p. 263. See also 82 
C.J.S., Statutes, Sec. 384, p. 904. Yowngdale v. Burton, 
102 Ft. 169, 128 P.2d 1053 (1942). It is therefore reason-
able to conclude that the framers intentionally omitted the 
the word "herein" from Article VII, Section 10, and in 
so doing intended a different result to follow than in the 
rasps of McCornick vs. Pratt, supra, and People vs. 
Cla;yton, supra. 
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A cardinal rule of constitutional construction is that 
the words must be construed in the light of what was in-
tended by the framers of the instrument. In the case of 
State ex rel. i:. Eldredge, 27 Utah 477, 76 P. 337, (1904) 
339, this court said: 
" ... In construing the suprPrnP law, the 
meaning of the framers must be ascertainl:'d fr 0111 
the whole purview of the instrument, and, in con-
struing a particular section, the court may ref er 
to any other section or provision to ascertain what 
was the object, purpose, and intention of t.he Con-
stitution makers in adopting such section. . .. " 
See also University of Utah v. Board of Examiners 
of Utah, 4 Utah 2d 408, 295 P.2d 348, 361 (1956). 
The result reached in the early Utah cases cited by 
plaintiff in his brief, llf cCornick i:. Pratt, 8 Pt. 29-1-, 30 
P. 1091 (1892) and Dwncan i:. McAllister, 1 Ft. 81 
(1873), referring to the comparable provision of the 
Organic Act of the Utah Territory have been previously 
explained. 
Plaintiff also cites a number of cases from North 
Carolina for the proposition that the legislature has no 
authority to fill offices created by it. However, the North 
Carolina provision expressly prohibited the general 
assembly from appointing any officer whose office was 
created by the constitution or "created by law." When 
that language was later removed by constitutional Anwnd-
ment the Supreme Court of North Carolina has held that 
the legislature of that state can make such appointments. 
These cases are entirely consistent with defendants' 
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position and argue persuasively against the strained 
interpretation sought by plaintiff. 
As noted previously, the people are the final reposi-
tory of the powers of government. They can delegate 
these rights to the Legislature through the Constitution. 
The people of North Carolina determined to do it one 
wav and the people of Utah determined to repose this . ' 
power in the legislature rather than the governor. 
If as the plaintiff contends, it was the intention of 
the framers of the Utah Constitution by adopting Article 
VII, Section 10, to place in the governor, "the power 
to appoint all executive officers whose election or ap-
pointment is not otherwise provided for in the Constitu-
tion" an interpretation must be adopted that is at vari-
ance with 70 years of legislative history in this state. For 
not only would such a strained construction give to the 
gowrnor the right, but would require him to appoint not 
only all "state officers," but also the "district officers" 
as well. The rend which would result in the civil fabric of 
our state would virtually be complete. All district and 
state officers who have and presently are appointed or 
elected pursuant to laws enacted by the legislature since 
1S9G must be declared to have held, and to hold office 
illegally. A degree of clairvoyance must be ascribed to 
the Constitutional convention which has not heretofore 
been recognized. Plaintiff in effect contends that he is 
required by constitutional mandate to make every ap-
pointment to every district or state office not otherwise 
set forth in the Constitution. This position approaches 
the absurd. The framers of the Constitution could not 
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look into the future 70 years and detennine what 
or district agencies would be needed to carry on the busi-
ness of government. In their wisdom they left these de-
cisions to future legislatures. To demonstrate in a small 
way the violence which would be done to the structure 
of our government if the governor were to make all ap-
pointments to district and state offices, there is listed 
below ·some of the agencies of government which would 
be affected. The procedure of "appointment" or "ejee- 1 
ti on" provided for by law is also noted: 
Section 8-1-1, et seq., U.C.A., 1953, establishes 
procedures for election of Cemetery Maintenance 
Board (L. of Ut., 1945, Ch. 17). 
Section 8-4-4, U.C.A., 1953, establishes the 
cemetery board with five members as designated 
by the director of registration. (L. of Ut., 1955, 
Ch. 11). 
Section 17-6-3.1, U.C.A., 1953, creates water 
and sewage districts which are governed by a 
board of trustees of each district created. Provi-
sion is made for election or appointment by some-
one other than the governor. (L. of Ut., 1953, Ch. 
29.) 
Section 11-11-15, U.C.A., 1953, creates audi- , 
torium and sports arena districts, each of which 
is governed by a board of directors which consist 
of nine members, each appointed by someone other 
than the governor. (L. of Ut., 1961, Ch. 26.) 
Section 13-2-3, U.C.A., 1953, provides for the 
appointment of the executive secretary of tlrn 
Trade Commission, who is appointed by the Trade 
Commission. (L. of Ut., 1937, Ch.19.) 
Section 17-27-17, U.C.A., 1953, provides for 
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the appointment of the district planning commis-
sioner by the county commissioners. (L. of Ut. 
1941, Ch. 23.) 
Section 17-28-1, U.C.A., 1953, establishes the 
fireman's civil service commission, the members 
of which are appointed by the county commission-
ers. ( L. of U t., 1945, Ch. 36.) 
Section 20-1-7.3, U.C.A., 1953, creates a judi-
cial nominating commission consisting of seven 
members as follows: The chief justice of the 
Supreme Court, one commissioner chosen by the 
senate, one commissioner chosen by the house of 
representatives, two commissioners chosen by the 
governor, and two commissioners chosen by the 
Utah state bar association. (L. of Ut., 1967, Ch. 
35.) 
Section 20-1-7.6, U.C.A., 1953, provides in the 
event the governor fails to appoint one of the 
three persons submitted to him, within thirty 
days after he has received the list containing the 
names of three individuals, ". . . the chief justice 
of the Supreme Court shall forthwith appoint one 
of the persons named on the list to fill such office." 
(L. of Ut. 1957, Ch. 35.) 
Section 23-2-9, U.C.A. 1953, provides for the 
appointment of the director of fish and game by 
the board of fish and game. (L. of Ut., 1953, Ch. 
39.) 
Section 23-4-2, U.C.A., 1953, establishes the 
board of big game control, comprised of five mem-
bers, appointed by the governor, with the advice 
and consent of the Senate as follows: The director 
of the division of fish and game, a landowner 
nominated by the Utah State Cattlemen's Associa-
tion, a member nominated to the governor by the 
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Utah State Woolgrower's Association, a member 
nominated to the governor by the Utah Wildlif P 
Federation, and a regional officer in Utah of tlte 
U.S. Forest Service. (L. of Ut., 1953, Ch. 39.) 
Section 24-2-2, U.C.A., 1953, creates the boarJ 
of forestry and fire control which consists of the 1 
board of state lands. The board of state land con-
sists of the state superintendent of public instruc- 1 
tion, or such other person designated by him, and ! 
six others appointed by the governor. (L. of Ut. 
1961, Ch. 53.) 
Section 26-14-6, U.C.A., 1953, establishes a 
board of trusttees to govern mosquito abatement 1 
districts. The board consists of persons appointed 
by district and county officials. ( L. of U t. 1923, 
Ch. 90.) 
Section 26-15-3, creates the office of director 
of division of health, who is appointed by the 
Board of Health (L. of Ut., 1953, Ch. 174.) 
Section 26-16-5, U.C.A., 1953, creates the 
health facilities council which is appointed by the 
governor, but must be the director of public health, 
the chairman of the Utah State Welfare Commis-
sion, and other designated individuals. (L. of 
Ut., 1955, Ch. 40.) 
Section 37-4-3, U.C.A., 1953, establishes a I 
state library commission composed of nine mern- 1 
hers appointed by the governor with the advice 
and consent of the senate. One is appointed on 
recommendation of each of the following agencies: 
State department of public instruction, the library ' 
board, the legislative council and the state histori-
cal ·society. The secretary of state is designated 
a member ex officio. (L. of Ut., 1957, Ch. 68.) 
Section 49-1-2, U.C.A., 1953, establishes a 
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board of trustees of public employees retirement 
svstem composed of five members who are selected 
a"s follows: one is the state auditor, two are elect-
ed and two are appointed by the governor. (L. of 
Ut. 1951 (1st SS), Ch. 21.) 
Section 51-1-2, U.C.A., 1953, creates the state 
depository board composed of the state bank com-
missioner, the attorney general and a citizen ap-
pointed by the governor. (L. of Ut., 1933, Ch. 47.) 
Section 53-13-1, U.C.A., 1953, establishes the 
textbook commission which consists of the State 
course of study commission. (A form of this stat-
ute has been effective in Utah since 1898.) 
Section 53-14-1, U.C.A., 1953, establishes the 
State course of study commission, which consists 
of the state superintendent, deans of each state 
schools of education of the University of Utah and 
Utah State Agricultural College, three school su-
perintendents to be appointed by the state board 
of education and five lay citizens to be appointed 
by the governor. (L. of Ut. 1907, Ch. 57.) 
Section 55-10-69, U.C.A., 1953, establishes a 
juvenile court commission, the membership of 
which consists of the chief justice of the Supreme 
Court or a justice of that court designated by the 
chief justice, the chairman of the public welfare 
commission, or a member of that commission des-
ignated by the chairman, the president of the 
Utah State Bar, or a member of the State Bar 
Commission designated by the President, the 
State Superintendent of public instruction, and 
the state director of public health. (L. of Ut., 
1965, Ch. 1G5.) 
Section 63-5-2, U.C.A., 1953, establishes the 
state council of defense, which is composed of tlie 
Governor, the Secretary of State, the Attorney 
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General, the President of the Senate, the Speaker . 
of the House, and four members appointed by the ' 
Governor. (L. of Ut., 1941 (2nd S.S.), Ch. 33.) 
Section 63-7-1, U.C.A., 1953, establishes the 
Senate Committee on Interstate Cooperation which 
consists of five senators designated in the same 
manner as is customary in the case of the members 
and chairman of other standing committees of the 
senate. (L. of Ut., 1939, Ch. 130.) 
Section 63-7-4-, U.C.A., 1953, establishing the 
Utah commission on Interstate Co-operation is 
composed of fifteen members as follows: 
(1) The five members of the senate commit-
tee on interstate co-operation. 
(2) The five members of the house committee 
on interstate co-operation. 
(3) The five members of the governor's com-
mitte on interstate co-operation. 
The governor, the president of the senate and 
the speaker of the house of representatives are ex 
officio honorary non-voting members of the com-
mission. The chairman of the governor's com-
mittee on interstate cooperation is the ex officio 
chairman of this commission. The chairman of the 
senate committee on interstate cooperation is the 
ex officio first vice chairman of the commission 
and the chairman of the house committee is the 
ex officio ·second vice chairman of the commission. 
(L. of Ut., 1939, Ch. 30.) 
Section 63-26-2, U.C.A., 1953, thr 
Utah council on aging consisting of eleven mem-
bers as follows : One appointed by industrial com-
mission, one appointed by department of health, 
one appointed by welfare commission, one ap-
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pointed by Superintendent of public instruction, 
two appointed by the speaker of the House, two 
appointed by President of the Senate, three ap-
pointed by the governor. (L. of Ut., 1961, Ch. 129.) 
Section 64-6-5, U.C.A., 1953, provides for the 
appointment of the superintendent of state indus-
trial school by public welfare commission with ap-
proval of governor. (R.S., 1898 and C.L. 1907.) 
Section 65-1-1.1, U.C.A., 1953, creates the 
state land board whose membership is as follows: 
The state superintendent of education, or such 
other person designated by the state board of 
education and six members appointed by the gov-
ernor. (L. of Ut. 1967, Ch.176.) 
Section 78-3-18, U.C.A., 1953, designates the 
clerk of the Supreme Court to act as administrator 
for the district courts under the court administra-
tor's act. No provision is contained in the Act for 
his appointment by the governor or other execu-
tive. (L. of Ut. 1967, Ch. 222.) 
Section 73-7-11, U.C.A., 1953, authorizes irri-
gation districts. Each is governed by a board of 
directors to be elected. (L. of Ut. 1919, Ch. 68.) 
Section 73-8-20, U.C.A., 1953, authorizes 
Metropolitan Water Districts, which are to be 
governed by a Board of directors consisting of 
representatives chosen by legislative bodies of 
each city. (L. of Ut., 1935, Ch.110.) 
Section 73-10-1, U.C.A., 1953, created the 
Utah Water and Power Board which consisted of 
thirteen members, two of whom were appointed 
by the Senate and two members by the speaker of 
the house. The Governor was also required to ap-
point seven from a list of recommendations sub-
mitted by the Utah Water User's Association. 
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(The name and make-up of this Board was changed 
by Chapter 176, Laws of Utah, 1967. See Section 
73-10-1.5, U.C.A. 1953.) 
Section 73-16-4, U.C.A., 1953, establishes the 
Bear River compact commission from Utah, which 
is made up of one member appointed by Interstate 
stream commission of Utah and two members ap-
pointed by Utah water and power board with con-
sent of the governor. (L. of Ut., 1955, Ch. 161.) 
Section 73-18-3, U.C.A., 1953, establishes the 
advisory council for administration of the state 
boating act with eight members selected by the 
board of parks and recreation with approval of 
the governor. (L. of Ut. 1959, Ch. 124.) 
This list is not exhaustive but rather illustrative 
of the many state and district officers who are not ap-
pointed by the governor, but are in effect the the appoint-
ments of the legislature, an official or quasi official of 
government or a private organization. As noted, provi-
sion is almos made for the election of some of these offi-
cers. It is perhaps needless to point out that the rights 
of citizens have been governed and fixed by these various 
officers acting on behalf of the state. A finding that 
these Boards were illegally constituted would be contrary 
to the stated and implied functions and powers of the 
legislature over the period of its entire history and would 
disrupt the procedures of government now existing and ' 
leave uncertain the rights of many citizens whose claims 
and rights have been fixed thereunder. 
The majority of courts considering the question have 
held that the power to appoint or nominate individuals i 
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tu public office can be validly delegated to private pe·r-
80ns or organizations. See 97 A.L.R. 2d 361. 
With respect to the legislature exercising executive 
powers, it might be observed that all the legislature does 
by the provisions under study is to provide for appoint-
ments to an administrative agency with no control what-
sover in the function of the agency. Nothing suggests 
that the legislature will have any administrative control 
or direction over the actual operations of the board. There 
is a substantial distinction between merely making ap-
pointments to a board which will function independently 
as an administrative agency, and a situation where the 
legislature would have a week-to-week and month-to-
month control over an administrative agency. 
II 
THE DEFENDANTS ARE NOT PRECLUDED BY ARTI-
CLE V, SECTION 1 OF THE STATE CONSTITUTION, PRO-
VIDING FOR THE SEPARATION OF POWERS, FROM MAK-
ING APPOINTMENTS TO THE BOARD OF HIGHER EDU-
CATION AS REQUIRED BY 53-48-5 UTAH CODE ANNO-
TATED, 1953. 
Article V must be construed in harmony with othe·r 
provisions of the Constitution. It contains no express 
prohibition against the appointive authority being vested 
in persons other than the executive. On the other hand, 
Article VII, Section 10, by its plain wording contemplates 
that the Legislature shall have the power to "otherwise 
provide" for a means of appointing state officers. Thus, 
Article VII, Section 10, must be in the first instance con-
strued as a limitation on the board general language of 
Article V since the former is express in its provision. 
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This factor is essential to a clear appreciation of the 
cases cited in plaintiff's brief and for the proposition 
he espouses that the appointment of officers is an execu-
tive function. 
The plaintiff cites language from cases of the United 
States Supreme Court for his position, however, these 
cases are readily distinguishable from the case now be-
fore the court both on the facts and the applicable law. ' 
It is clear Congress cannot appoint officers of the United 
States, because such would constitute a violation of the 
separation of powers doctrine expressed in clear language 
in the Constitution of the United States. Article II, Sec. 
tion 2 provides : 
". . . and by and with the Advice and Con-
sent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, 
other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the 
Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the 
United States, whose Appointments are not here-
in otherwise provided for, and which shall be es-
tablished by Law: . . . '' (Emphasis added.) 
Thus, the express language of the U.S. Constitution 
allows Congress to appoint officers only where the Con-
stitution "herein" otherwise providd. That language is 
not found in Article VII, Section 10, of the Utah Constitu-
tion, although it was in the Organic Act, People v. Clay-
ton, 4 Ut. 421, 11 P. 206 (1886), and was not carriPd owr 
into the Constitution it must be concluded that the Utah 
Constitution was not intended to limit the appointment 
power to the Governor either expressly, or on the basis 
of the implications in the concept of separation of powers. 
The plaintiff also relies upon a number of decisions 
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from other states to support his separation of powers 
contention. The Constitutions of Indiana and Massachu-
setts do not contain the same permissive language as the 
Utah Constitution, and therefore the cited cases do not 
pertain to the necessary question of Constitutional con-
struction before the Court. Even so, in In re Opinion 
of the Justices, 302 Mass. 605, 19 N.E.2d 807 (1939), cited 
in plaintiff's brief at page 30, the Court refused to say 
the executive nature of the power to appoint and remove 
placed such power exclusively with the Governor. These 
cases obviously involved Constitutional provision not 
similar to Article VII, Section 10 of the Utah Constitu-
tion. 
Equally inapplicable are the provisions of the Consti-
tutions of Kansas, Arkansas, and Missouri. Appellants' 
reliance upon the cases cited from those jurisdictions is 
misplaced and are not applicable to the case now before 
the court. The Colorado Supreme Court has apparently 
rejected, in an analogous case, the position of the Ne-
braska and Missouri courts in the cases cited in Appel-
lants' Brief. People ex rel TValker v. Capp, 61 Colo. 396, 
158 P. 1-13 (1916). 1 As noted previously states with near 
identical provisions to Article VII, Section 10 have not 
r·.onstrued their Constitutions in the same narrow fashion 
plaintiff urges this Court follow. 2 
The ultimate issue in this case must be viewed in 
the light of U,tah's Constitution and decisions considering 
Artic!P Y. No decision of the Utah Court has passed on 
1This case is discussed at page 16 of this Brief. 
2See pages ·--- through ... ., supra. 
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the relationship between Article VII Section lO and 
Article V. 
At the outset, it is well to note what has been the 
traditional evaluation of the concept of separation of 
powers. Madison in The Federalist, No. XLVII, Vol. 1, 
at 331 (1916) stated with reference to Montesquieu's con-
cept of separation of power, which was at the base of 
the framework of the American Constitution and of many 
State constitutions: 
""" • • he [Montesquieu] did not mean that 
these departments ought to have no PARTIAL 
AGENCY in, or no CONTROL over, the acts of 
each other. His meaning, as his own words import, 
and still more conclusively as illustrated by the 
example of his eye, can amount to no more than 1 
this, that where the WHOLE power of one de-
partment is exercised by the same hands which 
possess the WHOLE power of another depart-
ment, the fundamental principles of a free con-
stitution are subverted. • • """ 
The Utah Supreme Court has in the past accepted the 
Montesquieu conceptualization of separation of powers 
when speaking of the provisions of Article V, Section 1 
of the Constitution of the State of Utah. Tite v. State 
T<tx Comm., 89 Ut. 404, 57 P.2d 734 (1936). The action of 
the legislation in this case hardly constitutes a usurption 
of the whole of the executive power, nor does it in any 
way constitute a major intrusion into the executive power 
when the constitutional provision of Article VII, Section 
10 is viewed in conjunction with the intent of Article 
V. Although in the case of Springer v. Philippine Islrunds, 
277 U.S. 189 (1928) Madison's writings in The Federalist 
34 
\\'ere qnoted with reference to the appointment power, 
it should be rememberd that Madison was not discussing 
the concept of separation of powers in general but was 
justifying the divisions of labor set forth in the proposed 
Constitution of the United States in an effort to obtain its 
adoption by the colonies. Consequently, the question of 
whetht'r the present legislation violates Article V, must 
be examined exclusively from the standpoint of the 
separation of powers doctrine of the Utah Constitution 
in conjunction with Article VII, Section 10. The last sen-
tence of Section 1 of Artcle V provides : 
" ... no person charged with the exercise of 
powers properly belonging to one of these depart-
ments, shall exercise any functions appertaining 
to either of the others, except in the cases herein 
expressly directed or permitted." (emphasis add-
ed.) 
Thus, the Constitution in Article VII, Section 10 expressly 
permits the legislature to provide for other means of 
appointment and necessarily exempts that action from 
the application of Artcile V. The court is not concerned 
with the wisdom of the legislation, and has no power 
to a arrest execution of the statutes, however unwise or 
unjust they may appear. Kimball v. Grantsville City, 19 
lTt. 368, 57 P.l. 45 L.R.A. 628 (1899), Breeden v. Lewis, 26 
Lit. 120, 72 P. 388 (1903). Nothing in the case of Lee v. 
the State, 13 U.2d 15, 367 P.2d 861 (1962) is inconsisten 
with the authority of the present statute authorizing the 
legislature to make an appointment to the single hoard. 
That case dealt exclusively with the question of whether a 
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constitutional amendment was properly adopted, and 1 
whether the ballot set out one or more possible constitu. 
tional amendments. A cursory reading of that case demon. 
strates that it, in no way, involves the question of the 
constitutionality of the exercise of the appointive author. 
ity by the legislature, nor does it discuss the concept of the 
separation of powers. In fact, nowhere in the case is Arti-
cle 5 even mentioned. The very reference to the case of 
Lee v. State, supra, indicates the difficulty of the position 
of the plaintiff, since he is required to torture cases to 
find any authority to support his proposition. In Tite v. 
State Tax Commission, 89 Ut. 404, 57 P.2d (1936), Justice 
Wolf writing for the Utah Supreme Court made it clear 
that Article 5 of the Utah 1Constitution does not totally , 
prohibit one department of government from exercising I 
functions that may be comparable to functions exercised 
by another department of government. The court indi-
cated that there was no prohibition against the State Ta.x 
Commission determining whether there had been a viola-
tion of law and imposing a penalty. It did indicate 
that where the exercise of the function was the exercise 
of judicial discretion, such as imposing an indeterminate 
fine, that Article 5 would be violated, but the court did 
not expressly note that the separation of powers concept 
does tolerate reasonable overlapping. The court observed: 
"The absolute independence of the three 
branches of government which was advocated by 
Montesquieu has not been found entirely practic-
able, and, although the threefold division of powers 
is the basis of the American Constitution, there 
are many cases in which the duties of one depart-
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ment are to a certain extent devolved upon and 
shared by the other." 
A similar conclusion is noted in Vanderbilt, The Doctrine 
of the Separation of Powers and Its Present-Day Signi-
ficance, Conant 1953, where Justice Vanderbilt acknowl-
edged: 
"The doctrine of the separation of govern-
mental powers is not a mere theoretical, philo-
sophical concept. It is a practical, workaday prin-
ciple. The division of government into three 
branches does not imply, as its critics would have 
us think, three watertight compartments .. Montes-
quieu, as we have seen, knew better. the three 
departments, he said, must move 'in concert.'" 
Clearly, therefore, with the Utah Supreme Court 
having acknowledged the general concept that there is 
permissible overlapping between the various departments 
of government, and Article V expressly excepting from 
its scope activities where the Constitution provides for 
the function of one department of government that may 
necessarily involve a portion of the activity of another, 
and with Article VII Section 10 expressly so authorizing, 
it must be concluded that the present legislation does not 
unreasonably infringe on the concept of separation of 
powers. The Colorado and Idaho cases, supra, discuss and 
uphold the constitutionality of statutes exercising the 
legislative appointive powers in the face of charges that 
the separtion of powers doctrine was violated. Historic-
ally the founders of the various states were of ten sus-
picious of strong executive power and placed numerous 
limitations on the authority of the executive to act. These 
limitations were imposed in many instances in spite of a 
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belief in the concept of separation of power. The Constit. 
uents of Georgia and Illinois are illustrative of some of 
the limitations imposed on the executive. Both ConstitH-
tions required that the legislature elect the governor. 
Georgia Constitution, 1789, Article II, Section 1 and 2. 
Illinois Constitution 1818, Article III, Section 2. This 
obviously illustrated the in the concept of 
separation of powers and is indicative of how Article y 
I 
Section 1 of the Utah Constitution should be construe<l 
in this instance in order to retain the intended flexibility. 
It is further noteworthy that the District Court in this 
instance expressly found that Article V, of the Utah Con-
stitution was not violated finding that historical practice 
in this state has sanctioned legislation similar to that 
now before the court. (R. 147, 141) 
III 
THE PROVISIONS OF 53-48-5 UT AH CODE ANNO-
TATED, 1953 DO NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE I, SECTION 24 
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UT AH, NOR THE FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES. 
The plaintiff's final argument is that Section 5(1) 
of Senate Bill 10, 53-48-5 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
violates Article I, Section 24 of the Constitution of Utah, 
because it is not uniform in its operation. A further claim 1 
is asserted that the provision also violates the equal pro-
tection clause of the federal Constitution. Article I, Sec· 
tion 24 has been held by this court to embrace generally 
the same provisions as the equal protection clause of the ' 
United States Constitution prohibiting unequal classifica-
tions. State v. Mason, 94 Ut. 501, 78 P.2d 920 ( 1938). Es 
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both constitutional provisions contemplate that 
diffrrences in application of legislation should not be arbi-
trarily based. However, it should be remembered that in 
!llaking such a determination it is presumed that the legis-
lation is constitutional, and a court will not declare an act 
unconstitutional if there is any conceivable basis for 
distinction. Further, broad latitudes will he allowed a 
legislature in establishing classifications. 
At the outset it is submitted that the plaintiff is 
'"ithout cause to complain. He is not a member of the 
class against whom any discrimination, if there be any, 
is directed. He is an appointing authority, not an ap-
pointee. He is not affected personally by the application 
of the statute. Consequently it is submitted that he is 
without basis to challenge the constitutionality of the in-
stant legislation. 
Even assuming the status of the plaintiff to maintain 
a claim of denial of equal protection of uniform opera-
tion, it is submitted that the claim is specious at best. 
The obvious purpose of the legislation is to permit the 
legislature to have a modest degree of participation in 
the establishment of the agency charged with administer-
ing higher education in this state. This is a legitimate 
purpose, and not a discriminatory one. This being so, 
the Courts accord to the Legislaturt> substantial latitude 
in determining how its policies should be implemented. 
Equal Protection, Harv. L. R. 1065, 1072-1078 (1969). 
Because there is a need for legislative input as respects 
the question of higher education in the State of Utah, the 
LPgislature can reasonably determine the manner in 
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which that input is to be obtained. A control on the ' 
gubernatorial appointment is afforded in the traditional 
sense. Consent of the Senate must be obtained. Legi- i 
slative input is obtained as respects the appointments 
of the Speaker of the House and the President of the 1 
Senate by according each of these officers the appoint-
ment prerogative. The only way the legislature could 
properly obtain a legislative check over the governor 1 
would be by making his appointments subject to legisla- 1 
tive control. Legislative check on the other appointees is, 
of course, afforded by the very fact that officers of the 
legislature make the appointment. 
It is significant that plaintiff cites the case of Baker , 
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), for the position that there 
is a denial of equal protection and uniform operation in 
the instant case. Subsequent cases have clearly indicated 
that where the nature of the agency was essentially ad-
ministrative, such as for the purposes of carrying out : 
educational policy, reasonable disparities in the appoint- 1 
ment prooess could be tolerated. In Sailors v. The Board 
of Education, 387 U.S. 105 (1967), a local school board 
was elected for each of several school districts which 
were unequal in population. The members of each local 
board selected one member to a biennial meeting at which 
the five member county board was elected. Suit was 
brought challenging the county board on the ground 
that it had violated the one man, one vote principle laid 
down in Baker v. Carr, supra. The United States Supreme 
Court rejected that contention holding that the func-
tions of the county board were chiefly administrative 
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rather than legislative, and that therefore the members 
such a unit could be appointed by delegates from dis-
tricts not equal in population. By analogy, therefore, 
since the action in this case is equally appointive, the 
principle of Baker v. Carr, supra, is not applicable, and 
the mere fact that one may be treated slightly different 
than another so far as legislative confirmation is con-
cerned would not render the statute unconstitutional. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURTS HAVE A DUTY TO UPHOLD THE CON-
STITUTIONALITY OF A LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENT UN-
LESS IT CLEARLY VIOLATES A PROVISION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION. 
A statute must be held constitutional unless it 
clearly violates a provision of the Constitution. Every 
doubt as to the constitutionality of a statute must be re-
solved in favor of its validity. A court has a duty to 
uphold legislative acts unless it is convinced beyond a 
reasonable doubt that they are unconstitutional. This 
principle has been enumerated by a long line of Utah 
decisions. Great Salt .Authority v. Island Ranch Co., 18 
U.2d 45, -1-14 P.2d 963 (1966), Wood v. Budge, 13 U.2d 359, 
374 P.2d 516 (1962); State v. Geurts, 11 U. 2d 345, 359 
P.2d 12 (1961); Parkinson v. Watson, 4 U.2d 191, 291 
P.2d 400 (1955); State Board of Examiners v. Commis-
sion of Finance, 122 Ut. 164, 247 P.2d 435 (1952); New-
comb v. Ogde1n City, et al., 121 Ut. 503, 243 P.2d (19'52) 
941; Snow v. K eddington, 113 Ut. 325, 195 P.2d 234 
(1948); Broa.dbent v. Gibson, 105 Ut. 53, 140 P.2d 939 
(1943); Keetch v. Cordner, 90 Ut. 423, 62 P.2d 273 (1936); 
State v Mason, 94 U. 501, 178 P.2d 920 (1938), 16 Am. Jur., 
Constitutional Law, sec. 137, p. 336. 
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In University of Utah 1'S. Board of Examiners ur 
State of Ctah, -1: LT.2d ±08, 295 P.2d 3±8, ( l!JGG), th(· 
court relied upon the general principle of :statutory con-
struction as follows : 
"In 16 C.J.S., Title Constitutional Law 34 
page 74, it is said: ' ' 
" 'Long acquiescence by the people in legis-
lative or judicial construction of constitutional 
provisions is entitled to great weight with the 
courts.' " 
The crucial language contained in Article Yll, :-;ec-
tion 10, was given interpretation by the courts prior to ' 
statehood and a discriminating use of that language was 
employed in our present Constitution. These factors are 
entitled to a great weight in favor of a constitutional 
interpretation of the legislation in this case. 
In Skeen v. Pain, 32 Ut. 295, 90 P. ±40, -1-12 (1907), 
the constitutionality of a statute was drawn into question 
because it authorized an ouster action to be maintained 
by an individual, whereas Article VIII, Section 18 of the 
Constitution indicates that all prosecutions are to be 
made in the name of the state. The court in upholding 
the statute observed: 
"To say the least, the question is not free 
from doubt and, being so, all doubts must be re-
solved in favor of the constitutionality of the 
statute." 
We submit that a fair reading of the constitutional 
provision in the light of its background and decided 
cases leaves no doubt concerning the constitutionality 
of the Section 5 ( 1) of Senate Bill 10. And, even if the 
court should find that a shadow of doubt has been ca:lt 
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across the face of this statute, "all doubts must be re-
solved in favor of the constitutionality ... " 
rrhe prayer of the complaint seeks a restraining or-
der enjoining defendants from appointing any members 
to the Board of Higher Education and requesting the 
court to declare that plaintiff has the exclusive power, 
subject to the consent of the senate, to appoint all mem-
bers of the Board. 
Certainly, if the provision in question is unconsti-
tutional, the court may not rewrite the section to provide 
that the Governor shall make all 15 appointments, and 
thus preserve the constitutionality of the legislation. The 
law is clear that an unconstitutional act or provision will 
not be rewritten so as to make it constitutional. 
It must then follow that since the composition of the 
board is such an integral part of the Act, the entire Act 
must fail and could not be saved by a severability clause. 
If the court could sever that provision permitting the 
Speaker and the President to make appointments, then 
the Act as severed and preserved would only provide for 
the nine appointments of the Governor, and the other pro-
visions of the Act relating to membership would seem to 
permit the Governor to appoint eight Democrats and one 
Rep11blican, and the other six appointments simply 
would not be made. This would be absurd and would 
frustrate the rather clear overall legislative intent. It 
thus seems that the act in its entirety must be consti-
tutional or the entire act must fail, because the provi-
sions relating to membership appear to be at the very 
heart of the subject legislation. 
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CONCLUSION 
All political power is declared by Article I, Section 
2, of the Utah Constitution, to be inherent in the people, 
It is they who have delegated the appointive power to 
the legislature of the state, except as stated in the con-
stitution. 
The people through Article VII, Section 10, chose 
to repose the appointive power with their elected repre-
sentatives in the House of Representatives and the Sen-
ate, rather than with the Governor, apparently in the be-
lief that the judgment of many is superior to the judg-
ment of one. 
As noted in the foregoing cases, decided by the Sup-
reme Courts of Idaho and Colorado, the exercise of the 
appointive power of the people by the ligislature does not 
violate the separation of powers doctrine. Even the 
famous proponents of our system of government realized 
that practical application would result in some overlap-
ping of functions in the administration of government 
This Court has recognized thi'S,. 
The language of Article VII, Section 10, adopted hy 
the Constitutional Convention of Utah was changed from 
that contained in the Organic Act which had been in-
terpreted as preventing legislative appointments. The 
exact language of the Colorado provision was employed, 
which had been held by the Supreme Court of that state 
as permitting the legislature to designate officers to fill 
offices created by law. Further, this Court has stated by 
way of dicta that the provision " ... if not otherwise 
provided for" referred to the legislative act creating the 
office. The Supreme Courts of Idaho, Montana and Colo-
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rado have all so interpreted the same language contained 
in the comparable sections of the constitutions of those 
states, in the same way. Additionally, a grammatical 
reading of the section leads to the same result. But per-
haps the most persuasive argument favoring a constitu-
tional construction of this provision is the fact that state 
legislatures for 70 years have impliedly relied upon such 
an interpretation and have passed a great many statutes, 
beginning with the first legislature in 1898, in which the 
election or appointment of state and district officers 
must be as "otherwise provided for by law". 
Plaintiff is without standing to claim that he is 
denied the equal protection of the law under Senate 
Bill 10, and even if such standing were present, the doc-
trine is not applicable in this case. 
Every doubt, if any there be, should be resolved 
in favor of a constitutional construction of Senate Bill 
10. The court has a duty to uphold the act unless it is 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that it is uncon-
stitutional. 
We submit that section 5(1) of Senate Bill 10 is 
valid in every respect, and should be declared constitu-
tional by this Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
REX J. HANSON and 
MERLIN R. LYBBERT 
702 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Respondents. 
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The undersigned hereby certifies that three (3) 
copies of the within and foregoing Brief was served up-
on the plaintiffs and appellants by mailing, postage pr(} 
paid, the said copies to their attorney, Sidney G. Baucom, 
Special Assistant Attorney Gneral, 1407 West North 
Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84116, this day of 
November, 1969. 
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